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Abstract
Growth of wages, unemployment, employment and vacancies exhibit strong asymmetries
between expansionary and contractionary phases. In this paper we analyze to what degree
downward wage rigidities in the bargaining process a ect other variables of the economy. We
introduce asymmetric wage adjustment costs in a New-Keynesian DSGE model with search
and matching frictions in the labor market. We  nd that the presence of downward wage
rigidities strongly improves the  t of the model to the skewness of variables and the relative
length of expansionary and contractionary phases even when detrending the data.
Due to the asymmetry, wages increase more easily in expansions, which limits vacancy
posting and employment creation, similar to the  exible wage case. During contractions
nominal wages decrease slowly, shifting the main burden of adjustment to employment and
hours worked. The asymmetry also explains the di ering transmission of positive and neg-
ative demand shocks from wages to in ation. Downward wage rigidities help explaining the
asymmetric business cycle of many OECD countries where long and smooth expansions with
low growth rates are followed by sharp but short recessions with large negative growth rates.
JEL classi cation: E31; E52; C61.
Key words: labor market, unemployment, downward wage rigidity, asymmetric adjust-
ment costs, non—linear dynamics.5
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Executive Summary
Wage and employment adjustments exhibit strong asymmetries over the business cycle. Nom-
inal wages tend to grow more sharply in expansionary periods than they fall in contractionary
ones, even in detrended data. We introduce asymmetric wage adjustment costs in a New-
Keynesian DSGE model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. These costs
are modelled by a convex function with lower costs for adjusting wages upwards than for cutting
them. This modelling device captures in intuitive and simple terms the downward wage rigidity
documented by many empirical papers. The model provides a rigorous framework to study
the implications of asymmetric wage adjustment for labor market dynamics, output, in ation
and monetary policy. We  nd that the presence of downward wage rigidities strongly improves
the  t of the model to the skewness of variables and the relative length of expansionary and
contractionary phases.
The contribution of this paper is on four dimensions. First, we systematically document
asymmetries across a number of variables of the business cycle for four countries (France, Ger-
many, United Kingdom, United States) and the euro area by reporting skewness for annual
growth rates and by providing statistics on turning points. Unemployment, vacancies and nom-
inal wages are most strongly skewed, whereas the asymmetry of in ation and output appears
more muted. Annual growth rates of hours worked show the smallest size of skewness.
Second, we introduce downward nominal wage rigidities (DNWR) in a framework of frictional
labor markets in an easily tractable and e ective manner. The presence of DNWR introduces an
important asymmetry in the business cycle: during expansionary periods real wages and in ation
increase considerably, limiting vacancy posting and employment creation; in contractionary
periods shocks are mainly absorbed through a strong decline in vacancy posting and employment,
while the reaction of in ation is smaller.
Third, we show that models with symmetric wage adjustment costs are unable to generate
sizeable asymmetries and even tend towards the opposite direction of what we observe in the
data. Downward wage rigidities, instead, correctly explain the directions of the asymmetries
over the business cycle and match quantitative results on skewness measures well, especially for
labor market variables.
Finally, we  nd that symmetric monetary shocks have strong asymmetric e ects on labor
markets, output and also in ation. Expansionary monetary policy shocks lead mainly to growth
in nominal wages and prices, but have more limited e ects on real variables. Instead, contrac-
tionary shocks a ect more strongly the real side of the economy. This asymmetry is due to the
fact that, following an increase in interest rates, nominal wages are reduced slowly, but in ation
decreases faster than wages, raising thereby real wages and having detrimental e ects on vacancy
posting, employment and output.
Regarding asymmetries in the length of expansionary and contractionary phases, downward
wage rigidity a ects the length of expansionary phases more than the length of contractionary
ones, but at the same time ampli es output collapses during recessions. The sclerotic nature
in European labor markets shields employment, but due to the presence of downward wage
rigidity hours worked need to adjust by more. Downward wage rigidities are only one source
of asymmetries over the cycle, with only limited in uence on the length of the cycle when
comparing to the data. Other sources of asymmetry appear necessary to explain the short and
violent recessions compared to the longer and smoother expansions of real GDP and investment.
Ultimately, these alternative sources may complement and amplify the asymmetries stemming
from downward rigidities in wages.6
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Wage and employment adjustments exhibit strong asymmetries over the business cycle. Nominal
wages tend to grow more sharply in expansionary periods than they fall in contractionary ones,
even in detrended data. The current crisis is no di erent in this respect: while nominal wages
have grown at a similar pace than in ation before the crisis, they failed to adjust downwards since
its incept, causing implicitly a sharp increase in real labor costs due to a decline in in ation. This
has a ected the adjustment of both hours worked and employment. In all industrialized countries
the decline of labor input during the  nancial crisis has been sizeable and fast. This paper
picks up on this stylized fact and raises the question: what are the implications of downward
nominal wage rigidities (DNWR) for the asymmetry of business cycle dynamics and for the length
and violence of recessions? Speci cally, we want to understand to what degree the observed
asymmetries in di erent variables may be explained by downward wage asymmetries. For this,
we assume that the main asymmetry in the economy is linked to the wage setting process of the
labor market. It turns out that wage setting is not only at the core of labor market adjustments,
but, in addition, it shapes the dynamics and asymmetries of other variables over the business
cycles.1
The contribution of this paper is on four dimensions. First, we systematically document
asymmetries across a number of variables of the business cycle for four countries and the euro
area by reporting skewness for annual growth rates and by providing statistics on turning points.
Unemployment, vacancies and nominal wages are most strongly skewed, whereas the asymmetry
of in ation and output appears more muted. Annual growth rates of hours worked show the
smallest size of skewness.
Second, we introduce DNWR in a framework of frictional labor markets in an easily tractable
and e ective manner. The presence of downward wage rigidities introduces an important asym-
metry in the business cycle: during expansionary periods real wages and in ation increase con-
siderably, limiting vacancy posting and employment creation; in contractionary periods shocks
are mainly absorbed through a strong decline in vacancy posting and employment, while the
reaction of in ation is smaller.
Third, we show that models with symmetric wage adjustment costs are unable to generate
sizeable asymmetries and even tend towards the opposite direction of what we observe in the
data. Downward wage rigidities, instead, correctly explain the directions of the asymmetries
over the business cycle and match quantitative results on skewness measures well, especially for
labor market variables.
Finally, we  nd that symmetric monetary shocks have asymmetric e ects on labor markets,
output and also in ation. Expansionary shocks with reductions in interest rates lead mainly to
growth in nominal wages and prices, but have more limited e ects on real variables. Instead,
contractionary shocks a ect more strongly the real side of the economy. This asymmetry is
due to the fact that, following an increase in interest rates, nominal wages are reduced slowly,
but in ation reacts faster downward compared to wages, raising thereby real wages and having
detrimental e ects on vacancy posting, employment and output.
Ample empirical work indicates that nominal and/or real wages in many European and non—
European countries are downwardly rigid. In the context of the International Wage Flexibility
Project, Dickens et al. (2007) use micro data on wage changes to show that asymmetries in
wage setting are widespread in industrialized countries. Within the Eurosystem Wage Dynamics
Network, Messina et al. (2010) con rm and update some of these  ndings, quantifying the extent
of downward wage rigidity across a number of European countries. By using more aggregate wage
1Barnichon (2010) draws the attention instead on the asymmetries in job  ows, i.e. job-destruction and
job creation, and  nds a strong importance for job destruction at business cycle turning points, beyond those
documented in Shimer (2007) and Elsby et al. (2009).7
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data Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) con rm the existence of both nominal and real downward
wage rigidities at the industry level for many OECD countries over the period 1973—1999.2
To study the implications of downward wage rigidities we start by analyzing the business
cycle of four industrialized countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the US) and the
euro area as a whole to systematically document asymmetries across a number of variables
over the business cycle. This is done by computing the skewness of annual growth rates across
variables and by determining turning points in economic activity and the employment cycle,
which reveals the length of expansionary and contractionary phases as well as their growth rates.
These methodologies deliver a robust set of  ndings on asymmetric adjustments, in particular
of wages, unemployment and vacancies. Nominal and real wages and unemployment increase
more sharply than they fall, while vacancies ad employment tend to fall more rapidly than to
increase. This labor market asymmetry is transmitted to other variables and leads at the level of
aggregate output to shorter and deeper recessions followed by longer and smoother expansions.
We show that these asymmetries are large and the  ndings are robust across countries.3
Following the empirical analysis we introduce downward wage rigidities into a New Keyne-
sian framework with frictional labor markets. In the matching literature pioneered by Diamond
(1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985) the adjustment of wages for new and existing
employment relationships has been at the center of analysis for understanding labor market dy-
namics. Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) call for wage rigidity as an important factor in explaining
vacancy and unemployment volatility. Blanchard and Galí (2010) and Christo el et al. (2009)
identify wage rigidity as an important transmission mechanism from labor markets to in ation.
Our model is developed to understand the e ects of di erent shocks on their transmission to the
economy at large via the asymmetric response of wages. It will be relevant to understand which
variables counteract the wage asymmetry and what degree of asymmetry is ultimately visible at
the level of aggregate GDP and in ation.
Downward wage rigidities are introduced by assuming that  rms face asymmetric wage ad-
justment costs as in Fahr and Smets (2010). The costs are modelled by a convex function with
lower costs for adjusting wages upwards than for cutting them.4 This modelling device captures
in intuitive and simple terms the downward wage rigidity documented by many empirical pa-
pers. The model provides a rigorous framework to study the implications of asymmetric wage
adjustment for labor market dynamics, output, in ation and monetary policy.
A similar framework has also been proposed by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) in a model
with monopolistic labor supply and wage setters as in Erceg et al. (2000). Their paper focuses
on the greasing e ects of DNWR and indicates strong asymmetries in the adjustment following
positive and negative shocks. Fahr and Smets (2010) extend this to downward rigidity of real
wages in a setup of a monetary union, and show that downward real wage rigidity has strong
detrimental e ects for the competitiveness of the country in a currency union. More recently,
Benigno and Ricci (2010) model the greasing e ects in an extreme manner whereby wages can
never be cut and highlight the implications for the slope of the long—run Philips curve. Our paper
complements this literature by introducing DNWR into frictional labor markets to better capture
2Real wage rigidity can be understood as the combination of indexation, either formalized or informal, and
nominal downward wage rigidity around the level of in ation assumed for indexation. In some countries within
the EMU, such as Belgium and Spain, indexation of wages to a speci c price index is institutionalized. And even
though indexation in itself generates symmetric wage rigidity, its application is often di erent during times of
rising and declining price in ation, especially if in ation is low or negative.
3The analysis of business cycle patterns, particularly of output, initiated by Burns and Mitchell (1946), has
focused mainly on the asymmetry of GDP with inconclusive results as summarized by Harding and Pagan (2002).
Compared to GDP other variables exhibit much stronger asymmetries in their cyclical adjustment. See also McKay
and Reis (2008) and their appendix for a discussion of alternative methods for the measurement of asymmetries
4Speci cally, the asymmetry is inserted through a combination of a symmetric and a linex adjustment cost
function dependent on either nominal or real wage increases.8
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and document di ering e ects on hours and employment, and to study the interaction of labor
market institutions with downward wage rigidities. Di erently to the models of monopolistic
labor supply the need to bargain wages leads to a situation where the adjustment cost is partly
transferred to the employee through wage negotiations. The transfer varies over the business
cycle, generating an additional channel of endogenous response.5
McKay and Reis (2008) document a similar type of asymmetry for labour markets in the US
business cycle, but explain the fact that recessions are briefer and more violent with asymmetric
labor adjustment costs and the timing of technology adoption. Their setup is embedded in
a real business cycle model and may have di culties in generating real wage increases during
recessions, which we, instead, attribute to the interaction of demand shocks with downward
nominal wage rigidities.
In the last part of the paper we confront the model to the data and answer two questions.
First, are asymmetric features, beyond the non-linearities already incorporated in standard
New-Keynesian models, necessary to generate the asymmetries observed in the data? Second,
do downward wage rigidities improve the match between the moments of the data and those of
the model? To this aim we simulate the model with and without asymmetries in wage adjustment
costs to obtain the simulated statistics comparable to those in the empirical part. We show that
symmetric adjustment costs do not generate the type of asymmetries observed in the data, for
some variables the asymmetries even point in the opposite direction. The presence of downward
wage rigidities improves the  t considerably. Not only do all variables in the simulation present
skewness in the same direction as in the data, but the magnitudes are surprisingly well matched,
especially for labor market variables. The model is also able to reproduce the fact of shorter
and more violent recessions than expansions. Nevertheless, the relative length and the relative
growth rates between recessions and expansions of the model cannot be fully reconciled with
the data. This suggests that asymmetries in other sectors of the economy may be relevant in
shaping the adjustment over the business cycle.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the evidence of
asymmetries of a variety of variables, Section 3 outlines the monetary model with frictional
labor markets and downward wage rigidity. Section 4 discusses the baseline calibration, and the
main results are described in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
2 The extent of labor market asymmetries
This section documents stylized business cycle facts on asymmetries for four industrialized coun-
tries and the euro area as a whole. The asymmetries are measured on the one hand by skewness
in annual growth rates of macroeconomic series and on the other hand by a turning point analy-
sis following Bry and Boschan (1971) and Harding and Pagan (2002). The latter methodology
delivers statistics on the length and violence of expansions and recessions.
2.1 Asymmetries over the business cycle
The shape of the adjustment of wages, unemployment and vacancies is very di erent during
expansionary and contractionary phases of the labor market. Figures 1—3 show visually the
distribution of the annual log changes in real wages, vacancies and unemployment for four
countries: France, Germany, the UK and the US.6 For all four countries considered, real wage
5In an attempt to solve the "unemployment volatility puzzle" with the presence of downward wage rigidities,
Costain and Jansen (2009) model downward wage rigidity in the context of e ciency wages through a non-shirking
condition. They also  nd that the worker’s bargaining power is countercyclical.
6A similar picture is obtained using euro area data (see also Table 1). We did not include the euro area in the
graphs because the series of vacancies is not available at the euro area level.9
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Figure 1: Distributions of annual growth rates in real hourly wages for France, Germany, UK and USA. 1
represents the value of skewness. The vertical lines represent zero and the median of the distribution. Source:
OECD Economic Outlook.
































Figure 2: Distributions of annual growth rates in vacancies for France, Germany, UK and USA. See also caption
of  gure 1.
changes are positively skewed, which is also the case for the underlying nominal wage growth
and the in ation rate of the GDP de ator (not depicted, see Table 1). The positive skewness of
real wages implies sharp rises in rare occasions and reductions only by small steps.
Vacancy and unemployment growth rates are skewed in opposite directions. Vacancy growth
is strongly negatively skewed, hence falling occasionally sharply; unemployment changes are
positively skewed, with rare strong increases. The opposite skewness of the two distributions
highlights the strong link between unemployment and vacancies through the Beveridge curve.7
Table 1 collects statistics on skewness for more variables in the four countries and the euro
area. All data is quarterly and covers the period from 1970:Q1 to 2010:Q18. Other moments
7The mean of the distributions captures implicitly trend components, such as productivity for real wages or
trends in unemployment rates over the sample period.
8The skewness is computed on the annual log changes of selected macroeconomic variables, i.e   =
log( 4). The original data is quarterly and stems from the OECD Economic Outlook and Main Eco-
nomic Indicators. Computing the skewness on the quarterly log changes gives similar results. Excluding the
recent period of the great recession does not alter the skewness of most variables.10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1321
April 2011
































Figure 3: Distributions of annual growth rates in the unemployment rate for France, Germany, UK and USA. See
also caption of  gure 1.
are reported in the appendix.
Skewness of
annual growth rates
FR DE UK US EA
Wage rate 0.83 0.91 1.19 0.31 2.64
Nominal compensation rate 0.72 0.84 1.38 0.45 1.45
GDP de ator 0.77 0.64 1.62 1.09 0.58
Wage rate (GDP de .) 0.95 0.80 0.03 0.21 0.48
Compensation rate (GDP de .) 0.58 0.54 0.30 0.25 0.41
Unemployment rate 0.72 1.11 0.77 1.15 0.67
Employment 0.15 -0.23 -0.65 -0.78 -0.59
Employment rate -0.03 -0.40 -0.39 -0.86 -0.56
Weekly hours 0.37 0.63 0.04 -0.06 -0.35
Vacancy rate -0.87 -0.76 -0.80 -0.38 n.a.
Real GDP per capita -0.43 -0.67 -0.97 -0.69 -1.15
Labour productivity per employee 0.00 -0.24 -0.81 -0.47 -0.26
Private investment -0.60 -1.06 -0.73 -0.86 -1.23
Table 1: Skewness of selected macroeconomic variables in annual log changes. The wage rate is the basic hourly
wage, while the compensation rate includes also bonuses and social contributions. Source: OECD Economic
Outlook and Main Economic Indicators.
A few observations are worth highlighting. First, the wage and compensation rate9 in nomi-
nal and real terms are positively skewed for all countries considered, re ecting the fact that wages
increase more strongly than they decrease. Given that GDP price in ation is positively skewed,
the positive skewness of real wages seems to suggest that nominal wage asymmetries dominate
over price asymmetries. Concerning labor market quantities, unemployment is strongly posi-
tively skewed, whereas the employment rate presents a negative skewness. Weekly hours worked
exhibit a less clear—cut asymmetry across countries, whereby it is prone to the largest measure-
ment errors. On the side of labor demand, vacancy series are negatively skewed for all countries
considered.
9The wage rate is the basic hourly wage, while the compensation rate includes also bonuses and social contri-
butions.11
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Finally, output growth is clearly negatively skewed. If one considers that production com-
poses itself by the inputs hours worked per employee, employment and capital, it appears that
the factors with negative skewness prevail in shaping the adjustment of output. Indeed, beyond
the variables already discussed, also investment exhibits a strong negative skewness.
Overall, these statistics point to the presence of important asymmetries over the business
cycle, which appear to be key structural features of industrialized economies. Many possible
features may lead to asymmetries, di ering speed of hiring or  ring of workers, lumpiness in
investment, or endogenous borrowing constraints that require the built—up of wealth. In this
paper we focus only on one of these factors and analyze to what degree downward rigid wages
can generate asymmetries similar to the ones in the presented stylized facts.
2.2 Turning Point Analysis
An alternative possibility for analyzing business cycle asymmetries is to identify turning points
in univariate time series. Harding and Pagan (2002) propose an adaptation of the automatic
algorithm designed by Bry and Boschan (1971) to characterize expansionary and recessionary
episodes. Their algorithm earns dates of turning points similar to the NBER reference cycle
for US GDP. The procedure focuses on duration, amplitude and cumulative changes during
expansions and contractions.10 We compute the following statistics:
• Average cycle duration: average between peak—to—peak and trough—to—trough of a
variable’s time series.
• Average duration of expansions and recessions: average duration from troughs to
peaks (expansions) and average duration from peaks to troughs (recessions). The ratio
indicates the asymmetry in the length of expansionary and recessionary phases.
• Average growth rate during expansions and recessions: the ratio indicates the
asymmetry in the violence of recessions and expansions.
Output Duration (quarters) Growth rates Growth rates Cumulative
per capita (annualized) (dev.from mean) growth rates
Cycle Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec.
FR 19.2 15.6 3.8 2.34 -1.71 0.69 -3.36 9.1 -1.6
DE 24.5 19.8 4.4 2.95 -2.00 1.26 -3.69 14.6 -2.2
UK 35.1 30.0 5.0 3.48 -3.75 1.73 -5.50 26.1 -4.7
US 19.5 14.6 4.6 3.17 -2.68 1.71 -4.14 11.6 -3.0
EA 22.5 18.8 3.7 2.38 -2.31 0.78 -3.91 11.2 -2.1
Table 2: Turning point analysis for four selected countries and the euro area for the output per capita series (in
levels). Expansions are measured from trough to peak and contractions from peak to trough. Growth rates during
expansions and contractions are annualized growth rates, cumulative growth rates are the quarterly sums during
expansions and contractions. Analysis obtained with Harding-Pagan algorithm using the code by James Engel.
10See McKay and Reis (2008) and Barnichon (2009) for a similar approach. We perform the turn-
ing point analysis using the dating algorithm (modi ed BBQ) made available by James Engle on the site:
http://www.ncer.edu.au/data/. The algorithm can be described as follows:
1) Smooth the reference serie  with a series of  lters in order to eliminate outliers, high frequency or irregular
variations. Call 

 the smoothed series. 2) Use a dating rule to determine a potential set of turning points.
T h er u l ew eh a v eu s e di s :4
2

  0(  0)  4

  0(  0)  4

+1  0(  0)  4
2

+1  0(  0).3 )U s ea
censuring rule to ensure that peaks and throughs alternate and that the duration and the amplitude of phases is
meaningful.12
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Table 2 indicates that the average length of the business cycle across countries, measured
by GDP per working age population11, varies between just under 5 years and just over 6 years,
except for the UK where it is slightly longer. Expansions are four to six times longer than
recessions.12 The di erences in the length of the business cycles are mainly explained by di er-
ences in expansions. The average annualized growth rate during expansions is 24% in the euro
area and 32% in the US, whereas GDP declines by 23% during recessions in the euro area,
and by 27% in the US. The asymmetry in growth rates becomes more apparent in deviations
from mean growth rate, presented in the third column, where the the mean growth rate over
the entire sample has been subtracted from the average growth rate during expansionary and
recessionary phases. It appears that the euro area grows 08% more strongly during expansions
than on average, but during recessions the growth rate is 39% lower than on average.
The presence of asymmetries in trending data does not imply by itself a need for an asym-
metric model. In fact, as noted by Harding and Pagan (2002), a linear model with trend is
able to reproduce the asymmetric length and intensity of expansions and recessions. In order
to measure exclusively the asymmetry surrounding the trend we apply the dating algorithm to
the HP(1600)—detrended GDP and employment rate series13, which is illustrated in Table 3.14
HP(1600)—detrended Duration (quarters) Growth rates Cumulative
(annualized) growth rates
Cycle Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec.
Output per capita
FR 12.3 7.2 5.0 1.15 -1.64 2.07 2.05
DE 15.1 8.2 6.6 1.90 -2.37 3.90 3.91
UK 10.7 5.6 5.1 2.64 -2.38 3.70 3.03
US 12.8 7.2 5.7 2.20 -2.39 3.96 3.41
EA 15.2 9.0 5.9 1.10 -1.51 2.48 2.23
Employment rate
FR 10.6 5.8 5.0 0.98 -1.25 1.42 -156
DE 13.7 6.6 7.1 0.88 -0.90 1.45 -1.60
UK 13.8 7.5 6.2 0.75 -0.92 1.41 -1.43
US 13.3 8.1 5.8 0.98 -1.41 1.98 -2.04
EA 21.2 13.1 8.0 0.60 -0.95 1.97 -1.90
Table 3: Turning point analysis for HP(1600)-detrended output and employment per capita. See caption of Table
2.
Removing the trend from the data does not remove the asymmetries between expansions and
recessions, although they are considerably reduced (compare to Table 2). Despite large cross—
country di erences on cycle duration, expansions in output and employment are always longer
than recessions, except for the employment rate in Germany, where the opposite is true. In
addition, recessions are more violent (except for the UK output series).15 Recessions are hence
shorter than expansions and the variable drops faster than it increases during expansions. As we
11We apply the algorithm to GDP per capita instead of to raw GDP to abstract from possible population dy-
namics either through varying fertility and mortality rates or migration  ows. This also facilitates the comparison
with the model, which abstract from population dynamics.
12The underlying trends in population growth are very di erent across countries and an analysis in GDP levels
would earn longer cycles for European countries.
13See McKay and Reis (2008) for a discussion of the advantages of applying the Bry-Boschan algorithm to
detrended series.
14Applying a Band-Pass  lter with cycle length of 8-32 quarters earns similar results.
15Small di erences in the cumulative growth rates for expansions and contractions may be due to the situation
of the business cycle at the beginning and the end of the sample.13
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show in Section 5.3, these remaining asymmetries in the detrended series can not be captured
in linear models with trend, they require the introduction of asymmetric features.
3 The Model
In order to capture the asymmetric features of the labor market we introduce asymmetric wage
adjustment costs in a New Keynesian model with frictional labor markets. The aim is to develop
a parsimonious model revealing the mechanism through which downwardly rigid wages a ect
di erent variables over the business cycle.
3.1 The labor market
Workers and  rms need to match in the labor market to become productive. Their number





with ¯ 0,    (01) . The probability 	 for a  rm to  ll an open vacancy and the probability











where  =  denotes labor market tightness. Employment evolves according to a law
of motion including job matches and exogenous job destructions. A constant fraction 
 of
employment relationships is destroyed in every period and the number of matches  becomes
operative in the same period re ecting contemporaneous hiring endogenous job destruction is
not considered in this model:
 =( 1  
) 1 +  (1)
We de ne unemployment in period  as the fraction of workers without employment after hiring
has taken place in a given period:  =1   and  =1  (1   
) 1 the number of job-
searching workers at the beginning of period .
3.2 Household optimization
Each household is thought of as a large extended family with a continuum of members on the
unit interval. Consumption is pooled inside the family and family members perfectly insure
each other against employment  uctuations. The representative household maximizes a time—














where  is a preference shifter a ecting the discount rate and hence intertemporal allocation of
consumption, as in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009).









where  represents a Dixit—Stiglitz consumption bundle, 
 the real wage and  the gross
nominal risk-free interest rate of the nominal bond , and  is the aggregate price level.
Total real household income is the sum of the hourly wage income 
 earned by employed14
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family members  working  hours and the income by unemployed  = , growing with the
deterministic growth rate in the economy . In addition, the household earns the family share
of aggregate pro ts from retailers and wholesalers .











with  being the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The value of
employment for the family ˜  is
˜  = 







+( 1  
)E
h




where +1 =  (+1) is the stochastic period—per—period discount factor of households. The
net value of an additional employed worker in the family is the income from working  hours
net of the disutility of working  hours, and net of the unemployment bene ts that would be
received otherwise, plus the expected continuation value from the employment relationship.
3.3 Firms
The economy consists of two sectors of production. Firms in the wholesale sector produce the
intermediate homogeneous good in competitive markets using labor and capital. Their output is
sold to the  nal good sector (retailers) who are monopolistically competitive and transform the
homogeneous goods one for one into di erentiated goods at no extra cost and apply a mark—up.
Convex adjustment costs for prices arise in the retail sector, whereas search frictions together
with convex wage adjustment costs exist in the intermediate goods sector.
3.3.1 Final good  rms
A measure one of monopolistic retailers produces di erentiated goods with identical technology
transforming one unit of intermediate goods   (!) into one unit of di erentiated  nal goods,
  
 (!)=  (!). These are aggregated in a Dixit—Stiglitz fashion with elasticity " to the  nal
composite good   =
hR 1
0   
 (!)( 1)
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. Retailers maximize pro ts by purchasing intermediate goods
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subject to the demand function (3) and a price adjustment cost function   (#(!)# 1(!)) =
	 (#(!)# 1(!)     )
2 2,w h e r e   is trend in ation. The  rst order condition for the retail
 rm earns a Philips curve:
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where   = #(!)# 1(!)= 1 as all retailers operate with identical technology and set
the same price in equilibrium.16 The two—tier production setup implies that the price setting of
retail  rms is independent of labor hiring by wholesale  rms, but instead depends exclusively
on the relative cost of intermediate goods $ and on the price adjustment costs  .
3.3.2 Wholesale  rms
Firms in the intermediate goods sector use employment and capital as inputs in a constant
returns to scale production function17





where  represents the labor—augmenting deterministic growth rate in the economy, ' is the
aggregate capital stock and & is an AR(1) total factor productivity process.18
The representative  rm chooses vacancy posting and investment to maximize the expected
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subject to the law of motion of employment (1) and capital ' =( 1   ,)' 1 + *.T h e
vacancy posting costs are ) = ) and are consistent with balanced growth. + (*'  1)=
 
¡
*' 1   ,0¢2 ' 12 represents a quadratic adjustment cost on investment, with ,0 =   
(1   ,) being the growth-adjusted depreciation rate. Wages and hours are determined in a
bilateral bargaining between the  rm and the worker, described below in Section 3.4.
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The  rst equation describes Tobin’s Q for investment decisions, which equates the marginal
cost of investment to its expected bene t, consisting of the marginal product of capital, plus
the expected continuation value of the capital unit and the expected savings in investment
adjustment costs due to an increase in capital ( .++1.'). Equation (6) is the free—entry
condition for vacancies in equilibrium which equates expected vacancy posting costs to the value
from a  lled vacancy. It consists of the revenues from output, net of wages and their adjustment
costs, and the expected continuation value of the job next period, accounting for the probability
of separation.
The wage adjustment cost function is convex and may be asymmetric, indicating that wages
can be more easily increased than cut. We assume the functional form
16Under  exible prices,   = 
0
 =0 , optimal price setting leads to 	 (
) = (   1)
 and as all retail
 rms are identical in equilibrium,  rms choose prices to maintain a constant mark-up  over the marginal cost

 =(    1) =1 .
17In equilibrium all  rms are identical, we therefore avoid  rm speci c subscripts to simplify notation.
18The production may be re-written as  =  ()
 
1 
 ,w h e r e =  is capital per employee, which
implies that returns are constant with respect to employment once taking capital per employee into account. In
order to circumvent the problem of intra- rm bargaining as described by Cahuc et al. (2008), we follow di Pace
and Faccini (2010) by assuming that vacancy openings, hirings, wage bargaining as well as capital decisions occur
simultaneously. Given that the quantitative e ects of intra rm bargaining are found to be small (see Krause
and Lubik (2007), and Faccini and Ortigueira (2010)) this assumption should alter only marginally the e ects of
downward wage rigidities on business cycle  uctuations.16
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Downward nominal adj. costs (DNWR)
Downward real adj. costs (DRWR)
Figure 4: Di erent speci cations of adjustment cost curves. The horizontal axis depicts gross in ation. Dotted
line: symmetric adjustment cost function as used for prices, dashed line: asymmetric cost function for downward

































 = 2(2 1 
). 3   [01] captures the degree of indexation to the gross in ation
rate  . The parameter  determines the degree of convexity and 1 the degree of asymmetry in
adjustment costs around  
 . This speci cation nests the quadratic adjustment cost function










   
¢2 2. Figure 4 o ers a visual impression and a
comparison between di erent speci cations. We distinguish three main cases. In the absence
of indexation, 3 =0 , wage adjustment costs are set around the (gross) steady state nominal
wage in ation rate. If we combine 3 =0with 10, wage adjustment costs for increases
above the economy ’s growth rate are smaller than those for adjustments below that rate. This
captures downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR), the main focus in this paper. If 3 =1and
10 the asymmetry is around the growth—adjusted in ation rate chosen for indexation and the
wage adjustment function (7) allows one to capture the essence of downward real wage rigidity
(DRWR).
3.4 Wage and hour negotiation
Nominal wages and hours are determined through a Nash bargaining scheme between workers
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with 4 representing the exogenous part of the worker’s bargaining power. ˜  and 0 are the
value of a job for the  rm and the household, as speci ed in (2) and (6). The only di erence
from the standard setup is the presence of wage adjustment costs in 0 Bargaining over the
nominal wage yields an optimal sharing rule similar to the standard Nash bargaining solution:19
50 =( 1  5) ˜  (8)
with 5 being the e ective time—varying bargaining power of the worker
5 =
4























In the absence of adjustment costs, 6
+1 is equal to 1, and we obtain the constant sharing rule
with 5 = 4. With adjustment costs the bargaining power becomes state-dependent. During
periods of rising wages, .(
 .2  0, the e ective bargaining power of workers decline. During
periods of declining wages, the bargaining power of workers increase. The asymmetry in the
wage adjustment cost function magni es this tendency, i.e. the bargaining power is increased
by more in recessions than it is reduced in expansions.
The result from the wage bargaining for wages is

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  and 
  are the boundaries of the wage bargaining set.
Wage adjustment costs a ect the bargained wage bill in two main ways. First, a deadweight
loss component reduces the value of a job for the  rm and thus the bargained wage. This
e ect, captured by the term 5(
 
 , reduces wages independently of the direction of wage
adjustments they reduce the overall surplus generated by the match. Second, wage adjustment
costs a ect the wage through the e ective bargaining weight 5 of the worker. In situations
where  exible wages would increase, higher adjustment costs reduce the e ective bargaining
weight of workers 5. The reduction of 5, in turn, counteracts and dampens the wage increase
by reducing the weight on the productive part of the wage, and instead increases the weight
on the worker’s lower outside option. Similarly, a shock exerting negative pressures on wages
increases the relative bargaining power of workers and maintains wages higher than in the  exible
setup.
This mechanism highlights that, although adjustment costs are incurred by the  rm, they
are shared between  rms and workers through the bargaining setup. Times of wage contractions
are thus episodes in which the relative bargaining power of workers increase, even though wages
decline, and periods of wage increases reduce the worker’s bargaining power. Through the
movements of 5, wage adjustment costs have thus a dampening e ect on  uctuations in the
wage bill; this dampening e ect is larger, the more convex wage adjustment costs are.
19This follows the derivations by Arseneau and Chugh (2008) in the context of optimal monetary policy with
rigid wages.18
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 ,a n d#7 = .2 (..) is the marginal product of a marginal hour of work for the
 rm and the second term on the right captures the change in costs due to current and expected
wage changes using 6
+1 from equation (10).
In the absence of wage adjustment costs, we obtain that the marginal rate of substitution
equates the marginal product of labor, adjusted for the relative price. The introduction of
adjustment costs alters the amount of hours worked in two ways. First, they reduce hours
worked through the reduction in net productivity, and thereby introduce a wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal productivity as captured on the left hand side.
The marginal product of labor needs to be higher than in the  exible wage case to compensate
for the deadweight loss of the adjustment costs. A second e ect leads to an intertemporal
reallocation of hours worked, whereby hours increase when wages are larger than the marginal
rate of substitution and wages are growing.
3.5 Monetary Policy and Resource constraint
The monetary authority sets the short term nominal interest rate by reacting to in ation and
output growth. More speci cally, the central bank adopts an augmented Taylor type rule for












The parameters 5 and 5  are the response coe cients to deviations from target in ation and
to output growth. The term 8
 captures an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
3.5.1 Resource constraint
Final output may either be used for consumption or investment, else it is used to cover for price,
wage and investment adjustment costs or for vacancy posting.
 + * =   (1    )   )   (
 
    + (*'  1)
4 Calibration
In the baseline calibration the parameters are set to capture the main structural features of the
euro area. Time is measured in quarters.
Preferences. T h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r is set to 0992 in order to obtain a real interest rate
of about 33%. The value of the curvature of disutility of work  is set to 4,av a l u ei nl i n e
with empirical micro estimates.21 The price mark-up charged by  rms is assumed to amount
to 20% which implies an elasticity of substitution of intermediate goods of " =6and is well in
the range of the estimates of Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008). The steady state number of
hours worked is normalized to 1, which pins down the relative weight of the disutility of working
 through steady state relationships.
20See, e.g, Clarida et al. (1999).
21See Trigari (2009) for a brief discussion.19
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Discount rate  0992 Annual real interest rate of 33%
Elasticity of labor disutility  4 Trigari (2009), Christo el et al. (2009)
Elasticity of product substitution " 6 Mark—up on di erentiated goods 1.2
Production function / 03 Capital ratio of 30%
Capital depreciation rate , 0025 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Labour market
Job  nding rate 
 035 Elsby et al. (2009)
Job separation rate 
 0053 Reconciles unemployment rate  =9 %and 
 =0 35
Unemployment bene ts 085 Unemployment bene ts relative to wages  =0 66
Elasticity in matching fct,  04 Christo el et al. (2009)
Bargaining power 4 04 Chosen such that Hosios’ condition holds
Price rigidity 	 227 Conversion of Calvo estimate of 063 (SW07)
Wage rigidity  25 Wage Dynamics evidence of more rigid wages than prices





Response to in ation 15 Conventional value for Taylor rules
Interest rate smoothing coe cient 085 Conventional value for Taylor rules
Shocks
Std. deviation interest rate shock ;
 0115% Christo el et al. (2008)
Autocorr. of productivity shocks 

 095 Sahuc and Smets (2008)
Std. deviation productivity shock ;
 054% Sahuc and Smets (2008)
Autocorr. of preference shocks 
 085 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Std. deviation preference shocks ; 12% Targets 
<(=) ' 126 as in data
Table 4: The table reports calibrated parameter values.20
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Production. The elasticity of output with respect to total hours is set to / =0 7 re ecting
a capital share of 30%. The quarterly depreciation rate of capital is set to , =0 025 for an
annual depreciation rate of 10%, while the investment adjustment cost is calibrated to roughly
match the relative standard deviation of investment over GDP. Speci cally, we set  =6 ,a
value similar to the one used in Moyen and Sahuc (2005).
Labor market. In the baseline calibration, the labor market is calibrated setting the steady
state unemployment to  =9 %and the job  nding rate per quarter to 035, a value consistent
with the empirical analysis by Elsby et al. (2009) for a number of continental European countries.
Combining these two values with a constant participation rate normalized to 1, the separation
rate per quarter is 
 =0 053. This re ects the relatively rigid labor markets in Europe compared
to the US, where instead a job— nding rate of 0.70 is more plausible and average unemployment
is 5%, ultimately also leading to a higher job separation rate. The job  lling rate 	 is set to
09, which implies that the e ciency parameter in the matching function is ¯  =0 62.T h e
unemployment bene ts parameter is set to  =0 85 to match in steady state a replacement
ratio ()=0 66. We specify the elasticity of job matches with respect to job seekers to
 =0 4, in line with Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)’s estimation of matching functions. The
workers’ relative bargaining power 4 is also set to 04.
Price and wage rigidities. Under symmetric adjustment, the parameters governing the
degree of price and wage rigidities are respectively 	 and . For the convexity parameter of
price adjustments we pick a value of 	 =2 2 7, which is consistent with a Calvo parameter of
> =0 63 and a mean duration of about three quarters as found in the estimated Phillips curve
relationships by Smets and Wouters (2007). The parameter on symmetric wage rigidity is set
to  =2 5 . This is consistent with the empirical evidence showing that the rigidity in wages is
slightly higher than the one in prices, as con rmed also in the context of the Wage Dynamics
Network by Druant et al. (2009). To set the parameter 1, which governs the degree of wage
asymmetry, we use the fact that the correlation of nominal wage in ation and price in ation is
monotonically decreasing in 1.W ec h o o s e1 = 35000, which gives a correlation between price





' 042 found in the data. The
degree of wage indexation 3 is set to 0 to focus on nominal wage rigidity. The combined presence
of price and wage rigidities implicitly leads to real wage rigidity.
Shocks and monetary policy. The average quarterly growth rate is ? =1 004,i m p l y i n g
an annual average growth rate of 16%, a value which is in line with the average growth rate
of labor productivity and GDP per person in the euro area. The persistence and standard
deviation of the transitory productivity shock ! are set to 
 =0 95 and ; =0 0054,a si nt h e
estimates of Sahuc and Smets (2008) for the euro area. The persistence of the preference shock
 is set to 
 =0 85, as estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003) while its standard deviation
is set such that the baseline model predictions replicate the standard deviation of output, which
is 1.25 in the Euro area. We get a value of ; =0 012.
For the monetary policy we use a simple rule reacting to in ation with an elasticity 5 of
15 and a persistence in interest rates 5 =0 85. Regarding the shock processes, we set the
standard deviation of monetary policy shocks to 0115 percent, consistent with the estimates by
Christo el et al. (2008).
Table 5 compares the second moments of the data with the ones obtained in the model under
the assumption of symmetric and asymmetric wage adjustment costs, denoted by "Sym" and
"DNWR" respectively. The asymmetric model overestimates the relative standard deviation
of wages and hours compared to the data. At the same time it does not generate su cient
employment volatility, which is known as the volatility puzzle,  rst described in Shimer (2005).
For the remaining variables, however, the model appears to capture both the relative standard
deviations and the co—movement in the data reasonably well. We do not intend to contribute
or resolve the volatility puzzle in this context.21
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Euro area ;(@) ;(@);(=) 
(@=)
Data Sym DNWR Data Sym DNWR Data Sym DNWR
Nom. wage in ation 2 0.61 0.32 0.82 0.49 0.27 0.65 0.29 0.74 0.16
In ation # 0.36 0.47 0.47 0.29 0.40 0.38 0.30 0.49 0.39
Real wages 
 0.55 0.50 0.93 0.44 0.43 0.74 0.06 0.39 -0.11
Unemployment  6.55 3.94 4.59 5.24 3.38 3.76 -0.82 -0.83 -0.83
Hours worked  0.24 0.70 0.83 0.19 0.60 0.62 0.07 0.68 0.73
Employment  0.72 0.39 0.47 0.58 0.33 0.37 0.81 0.83 0.83
Vacancies  n.a. 8.97 10.67 n.a. 7.70 8.45 n.a. 0.74 0.75
Investment * 3.41 3.60 3.81 2.73 3.08 3.02 0.93 0.65 0.69
Output = 1.25 1.17 1.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 5: The table reports second moments of HP-detrended series in the data and two model speci cations, one
with symmetric wage adjustment costs (Sym), the second with asymmetric adjustment costs, i.e. with Downward
Nominal Wage Rigidity (DNWR). The computations for the data were performed on the sample 1970:Q1 to
2010:Q1.
5 The asymmetric e ects of downward wage rigidities
Asymmetric wage adjustments at the  rm level transmit to other variables either directly,
through production costs or through intertemporal considerations in adjusting wages, or in-
directly, through the general equilibrium responses of other variables.
5.1 Impulse responses
How strong are the e ects of downward wage rigidities on other macroeconomic variables? Do
they absorb and counteract the asymmetry from wage adjustments or do they reinforce it? To
address these questions, we analyze the dynamic responses of di erent macro variables to three
shocks: a productivity shock, a monetary policy shock and a time preference shock.















































Figure 5: Impulse responses following positive and negative technology shocks of 2 standard deviations.
We  rst consider a technology shock. A positive shock leads to an increase in the productivity22
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Figure 6: Impulse responses following positive and negative preference shocks of 2 standard deviations.
of employed workers that causes a simultaneous increase in nominal and real wages, supported
by a fall in prices due to lower marginal costs for  rms, as depicted in Figure 5. The adjustment
of wages is much stronger than the one for prices due to the relative rigidities in prices and wages
and due to monetary policy stabilizing in ation. The extensive and the intensive margins of
labor input, employment and hours per employee, initially co-move. Hours worked increase due
to intertemporal substitution, as  rms and households exploit the initially higher productivity
of the existing workforce. In addition,  rms engage in stronger hiring activity through vacancy
posting to increase employment. The persistence of hours worked and employment is very
di erent. While hours worked return to their steady state values already after few quarters,
employment deviates for a prolonged period of time. Three reasons exist for this phenomenon.
First, changes in employment are e ectively subject to an adjustment cost, the vacancy posting
costs, whereas hours worked are not, which eases the adjustment. Second, the persistence of
the shock leads to a prolonged increase in the value for  rms of a  lled job, when compared to
the steady state. This makes the payment of the vacancy posting cost worthwhile instead of
recurring to an increase in hours worked. Finally, the optimality condition for hours worked,
equation (11), relates the marginal rate of substitution by households to the marginal product of
an hour worked, altered by a term from wage adjustment costs. Once the initial strong nominal
wage adjustments have taken place, the additional term reduces to zero and hours worked is
determined by the equation of marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor.
As the adjustment of nominal wages is relatively fast this additional e ect through the relative
bargaining power also quickly returns to zero.
A comparison with a negative shock illustrates the importance of the asymmetries generated
by downward wage rigidities. Following a negative technology shock, nominal wage in ation
decreases only slowly and mildly and real wages are slower to adjust than following a positive
shock. The slow decline in real wages reduces  rms’ pro ts strongly. This, in turn reduces the
incentives for hiring new workers. Ultimately, hours worked and employment exhibit a stronger
response than after a positive shock, whereas wages have seen a smaller response. Overall, unless
transitory technology shocks are big, they induce only small asymmetries on the dynamics of
other variables.23
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Figure 7: Impulse responses following positive and negative monetary policy shocks of 2 standard deviations.
A positive preference shock, as illustrated in Figure 6, increases the discount rate of house-
holds, shifting consumption to the current period. This needs to be met by increases in produc-
tion. This is made possible by the positive adjustment in hours worked and the assumption of
contemporaneous hiring, which leads to an immediate increase in employment. Similar to the
technology shock, hours worked have a much lower persistence, due to their dependence on in-
tertemporal considerations. Beyond the rationale within the single equations, a complementarity
exists between hours worked and employment. The higher the amount of hours worked by a sin-
gle worker, the more attractive it is to hire workers for  rms, as this reduces the e ective hiring
cost for a worker’s input. Turning to wages, three factors are key for their adjustment. First, as
hiring intensity increases, the outside option for workers improves due to higher job- nding rates,
putting upward pressures on wages; second, the higher contemporaneous production increases
marginal costs, due to decreasing returns in production combined with the hiring activity, which
raises prices. Workers want to be compensated for this loss in purchasing power and demand
higher nominal wages. In fact, nominal wage growth is nearly as strong as price in ation induc-
ing only small changes in real wages. Third, the existence of wage adjustment costs shifts the
e ective bargaining power of workers 5 temporarily downward, dampening the increase slightly.
Following a negative shock, the presence of DNWR leads e ectively to an almost constant
nominal wage growth. The reduction in demand induces a strong contraction in price in ation.
And both e ects combined translate into a strong increase in real hourly wages, with stronger
detrimental e ects on employment and hours than after a positive shock. Monetary policy
plays an important role in shaping the speci c path of the adjustment. In our case is primarily
on in ation stabilization, which reduces the role in ation dynamics may play to support the
adjustment of real wages and to dampen the real side e ects of the shock. Indeed, as can
be seen in response to a negative shock, it is the faster adjustment of prices compared to the
nominal wage adjustment, that increases real wages following a negative preference shock. A
monetary policy with stronger output stabilization induces less strong e ects on real wages as
becomes evident in Section 5.4.
A third exercise involves a monetary policy shock, with a positive shock de ned as being
looser than the Taylor rule would imply and therefore expansionary. As captured in Figure24
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7), following an expansionary shock nominal wage and price in ation increase because marginal
production costs increase and the  rms passes these costs on to the consumers in form of higher
prices. With nominal wage increases being stronger than in ation, real wages increase. On the
quantity side the expansionary monetary policy is made possible by increasing employment and
hours worked.
When monetary policy is contractionary, instead, aggregate demand declines and in ation
decreases almost symmetrically to the expansionary shock. But the response of wages is very
much muted and consequently, due to the decline in in ation, real wages increase. The inherent
asymmetry of real hourly wages following a contractionary policy shock has strong repercussions
on vacancies, hours and employment. The response of employment is particularly strong. Over-
all, we  nd that in the presence of DNWR expansionary monetary policy mainly a ects nominal
variables (in ation, wage in ation), whereas contractionary monetary policy a ects real vari-
ables (real wages, employment). It may thereby be that monetary policy is itself contributing
to business cycle asymmetries.
5.2 Skewness
In this section we analyze the e ects of asymmetric adjustment costs on third moments in
growth rates of di erent variables . Two guiding questions structure this section. First, are
asymmetric features, beyond those already incorporated in standard models, necessary to gen-
erate the asymmetries observed in the data? Second, do downward wage rigidities improve the
match between the moments of the data and those of the model? To this aim we simulate the
model with and without asymmetries in wage adjustment costs to obtain simulated statistics
comparable to those in the empirical part.22 Table 6 gives answers to the two posed questions
by comparing the skewness of annual log changes from the model and the data ( rst column).
Output, employment, vacancies and investment all fall faster than they rise, implying negative
skewness, whereas unemployment, prices, nominal and real wages increase faster than they fall.
As illustrated in the second column of Table 6, these basic features of the data cannot be cap-
tured with symmetric adjustment costs. Most of the skewness of the variables generated with
the model are close to zero and even the direction of skewness in the case of real wages and
unemployment / employment are pointing in the opposite direction of their empirical counter-
parts. The little skewness observed in the model stems from non—linearities in the production
and utility function.23
By introducing asymmetric wage adjustment costs (column 3), and thereby accounting for
downward rigidity in the wage negotiation process, the model not only corrects for the wrong
direction of skewness of the symmetric model, but is also able to capture the degree of skewness
of labor market variables relatively well. As the source of the asymmetry lies in the wage
bargaining process, nominal wage growth is characterized by the strongest asymmetries. These
asymmetries are transmitted to real wages, but less strongly. In fact, in ation, which is also
characterized by positive skewness, is absorbing part of the adjustment in real labor costs. The
reason is that in situations where real wages are required to decline but nominal wages resist to
adjust, stronger positive price in ation facilitates the required downward real wage adjustment.
In ation is forced to adjust upward more strongly than it declines.
The e ects on real variables stemming from DNWR are most apparent for vacancies and
transmits thereby to employment.24 Following a shock requiring cuts in wages, downward rigid-
22The model was simulated for 100,000 periods using the shocks as calibrated before.
23These asymmetries are obtained with a second-order approximation. With a linear approximation even these
small asymmetries vanish, and the skewness of all variables would be zero.
24The model series of vacancies is not taken in  rst di erences due to the  ow nature of the variable. Firms
need to post vacancies every period to renew the vacancy of the former period. Most of the data series take stock
variables of vacancies, as they often stem from administrative sources. To make the model compatible with the25
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EA Symm. DNWR DNWR
data model (1=35000) (1=50000)
Wage in ation  2 
 1.45 0.04 1.06 0.99
Price in ation  # 0.58 0.09 0.48 0.63
Real wages   0.41 -0.01 0.12 0.21
Unemployment   0.67 -0.05 0.54 0.65
Hours   n.a. 0.00 -0.06 -0.11
Employment   -0.56 0.05 -0.56 -0.68
Vacancies   n.a. 0.04 -0.59 -0.87
Investment  A -1.23 -0.02 -0.08 -0.13
Output  = -1.15 0.00 -0.36 -0.48
Table 6: Skewness of annual growth rates of di erent variables. The table reports the skewness of the annual
growth rates for selected variables in the data and three model speci cations, one with symmetric adjustment
costs (Symm), one with wage asymmetries ( = 35000) and one with very strong wage asymmetries ( = 50000).
ity reduces the adjustment compared to the  exible case, which reduces the incentives for opening
vacancies. In contrast, a faster increase in nominal wages implies that more of the additional
surplus is attributed to the worker, which attenuates the increase in vacancies. The skewness of
vacancies and employment is similar because of the assumption of contemporaneous hiring; the
di erences are due to di erencing labor market tightness at the moment of opening vacancies.
In turn, unemployment is de ned as the complementary part to employment and is therefore
the mirror image of employment in terms of asymmetry. Hours worked exhibit a less clear cut
pattern, similar to what has been observed in the data for di erent countries. The reasons are
mainly due to the short-lived deviations from steady state values even following large shocks.
One can thereby clearly distinguish between short-term labor adjustment through hours captur-
ing the intertemporal shifts over few quarters, whereas employment re ects an investment with
in-built persistence and stronger skewness.
Finally, the e ects on aggregate output are muted, which re ects time lags between the dif-
ferent input components and the bu ering e ects of consumption smoothing. total production is
either used for consumption, investment or for adjustment costs. In periods of large adjustment,
the costs of adjusting absorb part of the asymmetries. On the empirical side, a lower degree of
asymmetry for output may be due to additional bu er mechanisms such as trade as well as the
inventory cycle.
Overall, the model with downward wage rigidities indicates in the right direction for explain-
ing the skewness in many macroeconomic variables. However, the model falls slightly short in
explaining the large negative skewness in output per capita and in investment that we observe
in the data. Indeed, increasing the degree of downward wage rigidities to 1 = 50000 helps to
increase the skewness of real wages to more realistic levels, but is still not enough to reach the
skewness of investment and output. This clearly indicates that other sources of asymmetry may
be present, probably located in the adjustment of capital.
5.3 Turning point analysis
Can asymmetries in the wage setting process also a ect the length of employment cycle, where
expansion are long and smooth and contractions short and violent? To address this question,
we apply the Bry and Boschan algorithm for turning points to the simulated data generated by
our model.
The  rst result on Turning Points in Table 7 relates to the fact that trending models with
data, the series needs to be taken in levels for the model ( ow) and in growth rates for the data (stock).26
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symmetric adjustment costs can indeed explain asymmetries in the output level, as had already
been noted by Harding and Pagan (2002). With trend growth output increases most of the
time, and expansionary phases are mechanically longer than recessionary periods. Introducing
downward wage rigidity has only a small e ect on the asymmetric length in this case. It slightly
lengthens the expansionary periods, but generates an important e ect on the violence of re-
cessions. The cumulative loss of output per capita in a recession increases from  19% in the
symmetric model, to  26% with the baseline degree of DNWR (1 = 35000)a n d 30% with
large DNWR (1 = 50000).
Output per capita Duration (quarters) Growth Rates Cumulative
Growth Rates
Cycle Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec.
EA Data 22.5 18.8 3.7 2.3 -2.3 11.2 -2.1
Symmetric model 18.8 15.2 3.6 2.4 -2.1 9.0 -1.9
DNWR (1=35000) 19.4 15.8 3.5 2.4 -2.9 9.5 -2.6
DNWR (1=50000) 19.0 15.5 3.5 2.4 -3.5 9.4 -3.0
Table 7: Turning Point Analysis for the output per capita series in levels. The table reports the turning point
analysis performed on the data and three model speci cations, one with symmetric adjustment costs (Symm),
one with wage asymmetries ( = 35000) and one with very strong wage asymmetries ( = 50000).
Table 8 shows the results obtained when the dating algorithm is applied to the detrended
output and employment rate series. It is apparent that once the trend has been removed the
symmetric model is unable to generate any degree of asymmetry in the duration between expan-
sionary and recessionary phases found in detrended data. Introducing asymmetric adjustment
costs leads to longer cycles driven by longer expansionary periods. Overall, though, the asym-
metry generated by the model falls short of the empirically observed one, both for output and
for employment.
Detrended Duration (quarters) Growth rate Cumulative
Series (annualized) growth rate
Cycle Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec.
Output per capita
EA Data 15.2 9.0 5.9 1.1 -1.5 2.5 -2.2
Symmetric model 14.3 7.2 7.2 1.8 -1.8 3.2 -3.1
DNWR(1= 35000) 14.3 7.7 6.6 1.7 -2.1 3.2 -3.5
DNWR(1= 50000) 14.2 7.8 6.4 1.7 -2.3 3.3 -3.7
Employment rate
EA Data 21.2 13.1 8.0 0.6 -1.0 2.0 -1.9
Symmetric model 13.3 6.5 6.8 0.6 -0.6 1.0 -1.0
DNWR(1= 35000) 13.4 7.4 5.9 0.6 -0.8 1.0 -1.2
DNWR(1= 50000) 13.5 7.7 5.8 0.6 -1.0 1.1 -1.3
Table 8: Turning point analysis for the detrended output per capita and employment rate series. The table reports
the turning point analysis performed on the data and three model speci cations, one with symmetric adjustment
costs (Symm), one with wage asymmetries ( = 35000) and one with very strong wage asymmetries ( = 50000).
Regarding the violence of recessions, measured by the negative growth rates during these
periods, asymmetric wages do indeed generate more violent downturns, with growth rates that
are larger than in the data in the case of output. Nevertheless, the ratio in growth rates between
expansionary and contractionary phases still falls short of the empirical observation. For the27
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employment cycle, growth rates are more muted than for output, as observed in the data, but
only with an unrealistically high asymmetry of 1 = 50000, the growth rate can be matched to
the data.
5.4 The role of labor market institutions and monetary policy
In order to better understand the relevance of labor market institutions and the role of monetary
policy for the skewness of di erent variables, we compare the previous results to two alternative
calibrations. In the  rst one, meant to capture a more  exible US labor market, we set the
quarterly job  nding rate in steady state to 07 and lower the unemployment rate to 5%.25 In
the second alternative calibration, meant to capture a more accommodative monetary policy
rule, we increase the weight on output stabilization to 5  =0 5, while the labor market
calibration follows the one used in the baseline. The results are summarized in Table 9.
The di erences between the European and the US calibration do not generate large di er-
ences in skewness. In the US-style calibration the skewness of employment and vacancies is
reduced, while it is slightly increased for in ation and hours per employee.
Comparing the baseline calibration with the accommodative monetary policy calibration, we
notice that giving some weight to output growth stabilization lowers the skewness of basically
all macroeconomic variables. The new monetary rule, by taking into account possible e ects on
employment and output in addition to in ation, smooths the asymmetries of the business cycle.
The presence of di erent monetary policies may thus explain why di erent countries present
di erent degrees of labor market and output asymmetries. In both alternative calibrations, the
model with DNWR falls short of matching the output asymmetry observed in the data.
Skewness of EA calib. US calib. Monetary
variables in ann. EA 
=035 
=07 policy
growth rates data =009 =005 5  =0 5
Wage in ation  2 
 1.45 1.06 1.02 1.04
Price in ation  # 0.58 0.48 0.66 0.42
Real wages   0.41 0.12 0.13 0.17
Unemployment   0.67 0.54 0.37 0.42
Hours   n.a. -0.06 -0.14 -0.02
Employment   -0.56 -0.56 -0.29 -0.43
Vacancies  n.a. -0.59 -0.43 -0.60
Investment  A -1.23 -0.08 -0.12 -0.06
Output  = -1.15 -0.36 -0.38 -0.24
Table 9: Interaction of downward wage rigidities with di erent labour market institutions and di erent monetary
policy regimes. The table represents the skewness of annual growth rates of di erent variables under di erent
calibration (see text).
To complete the picture, Table 10 presents the sensitivity of the turning point analysis on
the detrended GDP cycle to the two alternative calibrations. The higher turnover implicit in
the US—style calibration does not a ect the average length of business cycles, but reduces the
asymmetry between expansionary and recessionary phases. Moreover, business cycles become
much more violent, due to the stronger responsiveness of employment and output to positive
and negative shocks.
Under a monetary policy rule taking into account accelerating output growth, the degree of
asymmetry between expansionary and contractionary phases is reduced, re ecting more equili-
brated periods of recessions and expansions, while the length and violence of business cycles are
25Notice that this calibration implies simultaneously a higher separation rate in order to be internally consistent.28
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only weakly a ected.
Output per capita Duration (quarters) Growth Rates Cumulative
detrended Growth Rates
Cycle Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec.
EA Data 15.2 9.0 5.9 1.10 -1.51 2.5 -2.2
EA Calibration
!=0"35#=0"09
14.3 7.7 6.6 1.68 -2.12 3.2 -3.5
US calibration
!=0"7#=0"05
14.1 7.3 6.8 2.28 -2.80 4.2 -4.6
Monetary policy
 	=0"5
14.5 7.5 7.1 1.84 -2.16 3.4 -3.6
Table 10: Turning point analysis on the detrended GDP per capita series. Sensitivity to di erent calibrations
(see text).
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Downward wage rigidities are important for shaping the dynamics of the business cycle. Sym-
metric models have focused on second moments, but cannot capture numerous facts of third
moments, strongly present especially in labor markets. Accounting for asymmetries in the ad-
justment of wages allows understanding asymmetries, both in terms of growth rates and in busi-
ness cycle turning points, where long and smooth expansions are followed by shorter but more
violent contractions. We introduced downward wage rigidities into a New Keynesian framework
with a Mortensen-Pissarides matching model for the labor market. The asymmetric adjustment
cost in the wage bargaining process makes wage increases less costly and thereby faster than
wage cuts. This core asymmetry in wage dynamics directly a ects the incentives for creating
vacancies on the side of the  rm and in uences the decision of hours per employee. During an
expansion the fast increase in wages mutes vacancy creation and hence employment compared to
a situation with symmetric rigidity. During a recession the e ects on the real side are stronger:
real wages increase due to in ation rates below steady state, combined with nominal wages
that have di culties to fall. Here vacancy creation responds with a steep fall leading to strong
increases in unemployment.
The overall mechanism is present particularly for demand shocks, such as monetary policy
or preference shocks. In fact, a contractionary monetary policy acts primarily on real variables,
whereas an expansionary policy appears to a ect more strongly nominal variables, such as price
and wage in ation, leaving the adjustment of real variables muted.
Regarding asymmetries in the length of expansionary and contractionary phases, downward
wage rigidity a ects the length of expansionary phases more than the length of contractionary
ones, but at the same time increases output drops during recessions. The sclerotic nature
in European labor markets shields employment, but due to the presence of downward wage
rigidity hours worked need to adjust by more. Downward wage rigidities are only one source
for asymmetries over the cycle, with only limited in uence on the length of the cycle when
comparing to the data. It appears that complementarities with other parts of the economy exist
and amplify asymmetries. Hence, extensions building upon complementarities between the labor
market and other variables may further improve the  t of the model with the data on the issue
of asymmetries. In this respect a more detailed modelling of capital accumulation, as already
advocated by den Haan et al. (2000) in the context of a model with job destruction, may be an
helpful way to amplify the asymmetries and match the third moments of the model with the
ones of the data.29
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1: Empirical moments in growth rates
The following tables report the moments of the annual growth rates of key macro variables for
 ve countries: France, Germany, the UK, the US and the Euro Area. The original data is
quarterly and covers the period from 1970:Q1 to 2010:Q1. All series are taken from the OECD.
The series on vacancies have been compared with other nationally available series with no major
di erences.
EA Mean Median St.Dev. Skew Kurt
 2 2.83 2.68 1.23 1.45 6.22
 # 4.90 4.20 3.21 0.58 2.04
 
 0.40 0.29 0.86 0.48 5.72
  4.19 2.21 10.33 0.67 3.22
  -0.38 -0.30 0.40 -0.35 2.77
  0.03 0.25 1.14 -0.56 3.03
  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
 A 1.13 2.08 4.80 -1.23 4.47
 = 1.60 1.83 1.95 -1.15 5.07
Fra Mean Median St.Dev Skew Kurt
 2 6.25 3.62 4.76 0.83 2.27
 # 4.67 2.61 3.78 0.77 2.21
 
 1.58 1.21 1.48 0.95 3.64
  3.79 3.15 9.94 0.72 4.60
  -0.72 -0.76 1.56 0.37 3.31
  -0.20 -0.19 1.12 -0.03 2.58
  1.58 4.72 22.39 -0.87 5.69
 A 1.43 2.31 4.75 -0.60 2.59
 = 1.65 1.59 1.87 -0.43 3.58
DE Mean Median St.Dev Skew Kurt
 2 3.92 2.91 3.27 0.91 2.91
 # 2.71 2.31 2.01 0.64 2.79
 
 1.22 0.87 1.78 0.80 3.00
  7.54 2.42 21.30 1.11 3.48
  -0.81 -0.89 0.71 0.63 4.02
  0.16 0.30 1.27 -0.40 2.35
  -1.27 3.91 25.08 -0.76 3.71
 A 1.73 3.02 5.85 -1.06 3.73
 = 1.69 1.91 2.08 -0.67 4.00
UK Mean Median St.Dev Skew Kurt
 2 7.68 6.93 5.40 1.19 4.66
 # 6.27 4.62 5.21 1.62 5.42
 
 1.70 1.81 1.95 0.03 3.80
  2.04 -0.29 13.57 0.77 3.35
  -0.44 -0.42 1.36 0.04 4.24
  -0.01 0.25 1.41 -0.39 3.37
  0.92 6.92 28.39 -0.80 5.01
 A 1.75 2.43 7.86 -0.73 5.76
 = 1.75 1.94 2.38 -0.97 5.53
US Mean Median St.Dev Skew Kurt
 2 4.93 4.43 2.07 0.31 2.42
 # 3.84 3.13 2.35 1.09 3.26
 
 0.56 0.74 1.74 -0.67 3.30
  1.71 -3.71 16.78 1.15 4.00
  -0.18 -0.13 0.58 -0.06 2.71
  0.07 0.43 1.57 -0.86 4.08
  -4.61 -0.85 20.72 -0.38 2.83
 A 1.72 3.33 7.85 -0.86 3.77
 = 1.46 1.80 2.25 -0.69 3.5932
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7.2 Appendix 2: Second moments in log deviation from HP trend
EA ;(@) ;(@);(=) 
(@=)
ˆ = 1.25 1.00 1.00
ˆ  n.a. n.a. n.a.
ˆ : 0.36 0.29 0.30
ˆ :
 0.61 0.49 0.29
ˆ  0.55 0.44 0.06
ˆ  0.72 0.58 0.81
ˆ  n.a. n.a. n.a.
ˆ  0.24 0.19 0.07
ˆ  6.55 5.24 -0.82
ˆ B 3.41 2.73 0.93
Fra ;(@) ;(@);(=) 
(@=)
ˆ = 1.13 1.00 1.00
ˆ  0.37 0.33 0.47
ˆ : 0.46 0.40 0.15
ˆ :
 0.47 0.41 0.21
ˆ  0.59 0.52 0.02
ˆ  0.72 0.64 0.50
ˆ  14.75 13.09 0.58
ˆ  0.98 0.87 0.00
ˆ  6.23 5.53 -0.78
ˆ B 3.38 3.00 0.89
DE ;(@) ;(@);(=) 
(@=)
ˆ = 1.46 1.00 1.00
ˆ  0.40 0.27 0.48
ˆ : 0.56 0.38 0.17
ˆ :
 0.94 0.64 0.28
ˆ  0.86 0.58 0.35
ˆ  0.88 0.60 0.67
ˆ  17.87 12.21 0.71
ˆ  0.40 0.27 0.09
ˆ  14.70 10.05 -0.68
ˆ B 4.31 2.95 0.75
UK ;(@) ;(@);(=) 
(@=)
ˆ = 1.52 1.00 1.00
ˆ  0.45 0.30 0.29
ˆ : 0.99 0.65 0.00
ˆ :
 1.05 0.69 0.15
ˆ  1.22 0.80 0.18
ˆ  0.97 0.64 0.59
ˆ  20.16 13.24 0.76
ˆ  0.81 0.53 0.55
ˆ  8.59 5.64 -0.73
ˆ B 5.13 3.37 0.63
US ;(@) ;(@);(=) 
(@=)
ˆ = 1.55 1.00 1.00
ˆ  0.42 0.27 0.36
ˆ : 0.31 0.20 0.11
ˆ :
 0.65 0.42 0.04
ˆ  0.80 0.52 0.39
ˆ  1.08 0.70 0.83
ˆ  13.81 8.89 0.89
ˆ  0.40 0.26 0.71
ˆ  11.88 7.65 -0.86
ˆ B 5.43 3.50 0.93